









enewable electricity has increased significantly
in recent years on a global scale and especially
within Europe.A major reason for this development
at the European level is the national support strate-
gies triggered by Directive 2001/77/EC on renewable
energies in the electricity sector (European Par-
liament and Council 2001), which set the renewable
energy sources (RES-E) target of 21 percent at the
EU-25 level for the year 2010 and specified corre-
sponding targets for all 25 member states. All EU
member states have introduced policies to support
the market introduction of RES-E and most of them
have started to improve the corresponding adminis-
trative framework conditions (e.g. planning proce-
dures, grid connection) as well.The market diffusion
of new renewable energy technologies has increased
significantly over the last decade. The existing sup-
port instruments encompass feed-in tariffs (FITs),
quota-based tradable green certificates (TGCs),
investment grants, tender procedures and tax mea-
sures. Up to now, these policies have been imple-
mented exclusively on a national level and aim to
fulfil the national targets as set in the RES-E direc-
tive. However, based on the currently implemented
policies, these targets will most likely not be met in
the majority of countries,which indicates that RES-
E support systems are still not designed in a suit-
able way.
Evaluation of policy instruments for promoting
renewable electricity from a historical perspective
Classification of policy instruments and develop-
ment of RES-E policies in the EU
Within this study,the assessment of direct regulatory
promotion strategies is carried out by focusing on a
comparison between price-driven (e.g. FITs) and
quantity-driven (e.g. quotas based on TGCs) strate-
gies, which can be defined as follows:
Feed-in tariffs (FITs) are generation-based, price-
driven incentives.The price that a utility or supplier
or grid operator is legally obligated to pay for a unit
of electricity from RES-E producers is determined
by the system. Thus, a federal (or regional) govern-
ment regulates the tariff rate. It usually takes the
form of either a fixed amount of money paid for
RES-E production,or an additional premium on top
of the electricity market price paid to RES-E pro-
ducers. Besides the level of the tariff, its guaranteed
duration represents an important parameter when
evaluating the actual financial incentive. FITs allow
technology-specific promotion and acknowledge
future cost-reductions by applying dynamically
decreasing tariffs.
Quota obligations based on Tradable Green Certi-
ficates (TGCs) are generation-based, quantity-driven
instruments. The government defines targets for
RES-E deployment and obliges a particular party of
the electricity supply-chain (e. g. generator, whole-
saler or consumer) with their fulfilment. Once de-
fined, a parallel market for renewable energy certifi-
cates is established and their price is set following
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demand and supply conditions (forced by the obliga-
tion). Hence, for RES-E producers, financial support
may arise from selling certificates in addition to the
revenues from selling electricity on the power mar-
ket. In principle, technology-specific promotion is
also possible in TGC systems. But it should be noted
that separate markets for different technologies will
lead to much smaller and less liquid markets.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the main support
instrument for each country. Only 8 of the 15 coun-
tries regarded did not experience a major policy shift
during the period 1997–2006.The current discussion
within EU member states focuses on the comparison
of two opposed systems, the FIT system and the
quota regulation in combination with a TGC-mar-
ket. The latter have replaced existing policy instru-
ments in some European countries,such as Belgium,
Italy, Sweden, the UK and Poland. Other policy
instruments, such as tender schemes, are no longer
used in any European country as the dominating
policy scheme. However, there are instruments like
production tax incentives and investment incentives
which are frequently used as supplementary instru-
ments. Only Finland and Malta apply them as their
main support scheme.
Effectiveness of policy instruments
The effectiveness of a policy for renewable electrici-
ty is based on its ability to increase the generation of
electrical power.The definition of effectiveness used
in this analysis is given in the following equation:
This definition of effectiveness has the advantage of
being unbiased with regard to the available potential
for individual technologies in a specific country.
Member states need to deploy RES-E capacities
proportional to the given potential in order to
demonstrate the comparable effectiveness of their
instruments. This appears to be a meaningful
approach since the member state targets, as deter-
mined in Directive 2001/77/EC, are also mainly
based on the realisable generation potential of each
country.
Figure 2 shows the average annual effectiveness indi-
cator for wind onshore electricity generation for
1998–2005 for EU-15 countries. Several findings can
be derived from these figures.Firstly,the three mem-
ber states showing the highest effectiveness during
the considered period – Demark, Germany, and
Spain – applied fixed feed-in tar-
iffs during the entire period
1998–2005 (with a relevant sys-
tem change in Denmark in 2001).
The resulting high investment
security as well as low adminis-
trative barriers stimulated a
strong and continuous growth in
wind energy during the last
decade. It is often claimed that
the high level of the feed-in tar-
iffs is the main driver for in-
vestments in wind energy, espe-
cially in Spain and Germany.
However, as will be shown in the
section below, the tariff level is
not particularly high in these two
countries compared with the
other countries analysed here.
This indicates that a long-term
and stable policy environment is
















































































i Effectiveness indicator for RES 
technology i for the year n
Gn
i Existing normalised electricity generation by RES 
technology i in year n
ADD POTn
i Additional generation potential of RES 
technology i in year n until 2020success of developing RES-E markets. As can be
observed in a country like France, high administra-
tive barriers can significantly hamper the develop-
ment of wind energy even under a stable policy envi-
ronment combined with reasonably high feed-in tar-
iffs.
Economic efficiency from society’s point-of-view
In order to analyse the economic efficiency of sup-
port from a historical perspective we compare the
level of support in the case of wind energy onshore
and the corresponding costs of electricity genera-
tion.Based on this definition the analysis shows (see
Figure 3) that for many countries the support level
and the generation costs are very close. Countries
with costly potentials frequently show a higher sup-
port level. A clear deviation from this rule can be
found in the three quota systems in Belgium, Italy
and the UK, where support is presently significantly
higher than the costs of genera-
tion. The reasons for the higher
support level expressed by the
current green certificate prices
include still immature TGC
markets, the non technology-
specific design of the currently
applied TGC-systems as well as
the higher risk premium re-
quested by investors. In the case
of Spain and Germany, the sup-
port level indicated in  Figure 3
appears to be above the average
level of generation costs. How-
ever, the low cost potentials
have already been exploited in
these countries due to recent
success in market growth.Therefore a level of sup-
port that is moderately higher than average costs
seems to be reasonable.
Expected revenues and profits for investors
In order to correlate the effectiveness of an instrument
with the efficiency of support as defined in the previ-
ous section, the levelised profit of potential wind ener-
gy investments was calculated for Austria,Belgium,the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Lithuania, Spain, Sweden and the UK for the year
2004.Thus, calculations are based on the effective sup-
port conditions in each country during 2004.
By plotting the effectiveness versus the levelised
profit as shown in Figure 4, the correlation between
the levelised profit for investments and the level of
effectiveness attained by the support instrument in
the respective year is analysed.
In Figure 4, the expected lev-
elised profits as well as the effec-
tiveness show a broad spectrum
for the countries under consider-
ation. It should be pointed out
that the different instruments
have different levels of maturity
and that policy schemes in some
countries – in particular quota
obligation systems – are still in a
transitional phase. It is striking
that Italy, the UK and Belgium,
which transformed their markets
by introducing quota systems as
the main support instrument








AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK EU15
Note: This figure depicts the effectiveness indicator for wind onshore electricity in the period 1998 to 2005 
in the EU-15 showing the relevant policy schemes during this period.
EFFECTIVENESS INDICATOR FOR WIND ONSHORE
average effectiveness indicator 1998–2005
%











AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK
Note: This figure depicts support level ranges (average to maximum support) for direct support of wind 
onshore in EU-15 Member States (average tariffs are indicative) compared to the long-term marginal 
generation costs (minimum to average costs).
COMPARISON OF SUPPORT LEVELS AND GENERATION COSTS FOR
 WIND ONSHORE
EUR/MWh
Minimum to average generation costs
Average to maximum support level
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between 1999 and 2002, are characterised by expect-
ed high levelised profits but low effectiveness. The
high levelised profit results in particular from the
extrapolation of the presently observed certificate
prices.The results show that certificate systems lead
to higher producer revenues than FITs, which com-
pensate for high investment risks. Furthermore, the
recent development of certificate prices does not
show any decreasing tendency. On the other hand,
countries with FITs seem to be typically more effec-
tive at generally moderate levelised profits per unit
of electricity generated.The fact that expected prof-
itability from the investor’s perspective is signifi-
cantly lower for FITs is directly linked with a higher
efficiency of this strategy because additional costs
for consumers are lower.
Prospective analysis based on
the model Green-X
In this section we aim to signpost
the way forward by presenting a
prospective analysis of possible
future RES-E support options at
the European level. The effec-
tiveness and efficiency of sup-
port schemes is based on the
results obtained from simulation
runs using the Green-X model
(www.greenx.at). This tool en-
ables us to make a comparative
and quantitative analysis of the
future deployment of RES up to
2020 in all energy sectors (i.e.
electricity, heat and transport)
based on applied energy policy strategies in a
dynamic context. Geographically the assessment
refers to the European Union as of 2006,comprising
25 member states (EU-25).
Figure 5 indicates the investigated scenario paths
and the resulting RES-E deployment – comprising a
business-as-usual (BAU) case based on a continua-
tion of current national support schemes (BAU), a
national improvement and a harmonisation of RES-
E support at the European level based on either
technology-specific support, i.e. a feed-in tariff sys-
tem with technology-specific differentiated tariffs,or
uniform support, i.e. a quota obligation based on
TGCs commonly applied for all RES-E options.
Results with regard to non-har-
monised conditions – BAU &
improved national policies-
scenario
In 2004 the total amount of RES-
E generation within the EU-25
was around 460 TWh, corre-
sponding to a share of about
15 percent of gross electricity
demand.Without any changes to
the current support schemes of
the various member states, RES-
E would achieve a demand share
of 18.2 percent in 2010 at EU-25
level.If RES-E support is accom-
panied by energy efficiency mea-
sures as assumed for a sensitivity







Note: This graph shows a possible levelised profit per unit of electricity generated by an investment in wind 
onshore in 2004.
EFFECTIVENESS INDICATOR VERSUS LEVELISED PROFIT FOR 
WIND ONSHORE
effectiveness indicator in %
Feed-in-tariffs Quota/TGC Tender Tax incentives/Investment grants


























































































































































































on TGCs – harmonised
Harmonisation in 2015
Figure 5demand share of 18.8 percent is feasible in 2010. By
2020,these differences will become more apparent:a
share of 23.6 percent is projected for the default
BAU case, whilst deployment in relative terms is
27 percent for BAU with accompanying DSM.
In contrast, it would be feasible to meet the Euro-
pean target as set by the RES-E Directive by im-
proving the support conditions for RES-E rigorous-
ly and immediately in all EU countries, including a
removal of non-financial deficiencies and the imple-
mentation of energy efficiency measures. In the
“improved national policies” case, a RES-E share of
20.9 percent is reached in 2010,rising to 34.1 percent
in 2020.
The dynamic development of RES-E generation in
both cases is depicted in absolute terms at the EU-25
level in Figure 6. This graph illustrates the tech-
nology-specific deployment for
new RES-E plants and shows
the total RES-E stock (indicated
by the blue area) comprising all
plants installed up to the end of
2004. If currently implemented
RES-E policies are maintained,
as assumed in the BAU case,
the total amount of RES-E gen-
eration will increase from 460
TWh in 2004 to about 951 TWh
in 2020. This 2020 figure com-
prises almost equal contribu-
tions of new RES-E installations
(from 2005 to 2020) in the order
of 520 TWh (55 percent of total
RES-E) and the stock of exist-
ing RES-E plants installed prior
to 2005, which account for
431 TWh (equal to a share of
45 percent in total RES-E gen-
eration) by 2020 in the BAU
case. “Improved national poli-
cies” will induce a much higher
deployment of new RES-E in
the investigated period: by 2020
this will amount to 725 TWh
from new RES-E plants in-
stalled between 2005 and 2020,
corresponding to 63 percent of
the total RES-E generation of
1156 TWh.
Figure 7 illustrates the required
consumer expenditure for both cases investigated at
the EU-25 level due to the underlying national RES-
E policies and the corresponding induced RES-E
deployment. In this context, the consumer / societal
expenditure due to the support for RES-E repre-
sents a net value  based on the direct costs of apply-
ing a certain support scheme. This figure also illus-
trates both the technology-specific shares of new
RES-E plants and the expenditures associated with
the stock of existing RES-E plants (indicated by the
blue area).
The required consumer expenditures will increase
steadily over the next ten years with BAU.In relative
terms,expressing the expenditures as a premium per
MWh total demand, these are projected to rise from
a level of 2.1 EUR/MWhDEMAND in 2005 up to about
5.0 EUR/MWhDEMAND in the final years 2019 and
2020. Obviously, within the “improved national poli-
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COMPARISON OF RES-E GENERATION AT EU25 LEVEL
2005 TO 2020
RES-E - electricity generation
 BAU case
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COMPARISON OF NECESSARY CONSUMER EXPENDITURE 
AT EU25 LEVEL, 2005 TO 2020
yearly transfer cost for consumers due to RES policy
 BAU case "improved national policies"-variant
billion EUR/year  billion EUR/year
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cies” variant, characterised by a
40 percent higher RES-E de-
ployment in the investigated pe-
riod 2005 to 2020, even greater
financial support is required to
achieve the ambitious RES-E tar-
get set for 2010. Accordingly, a
steeper increase in expenditure in
the period up to 2017 occurs, cul-
minating in a peak at 7.7 EUR/
MWhDEMAND in 2017.
Harmonisation:Technology-
specific versus uniform support
Besides the above discussed na-
tional support options (i.e. BAU
and “Improved national poli-
cies”) the following policy options at the European
level are investigated below:
– Harmonisation of support based on a uniform
(non technology-specific) support scheme, i.e. a
quota obligation based on TGCs commonly
applied for all RES-E options.
– Harmonisation of support based on a technology
specific support scheme, i.e. a feed-in tariff system
with technology-specific differentiated tariffs.
In addition, a further variant of each harmonised
RES support case is also taken into consideration.
Thereby, in case of technology-specific support it is
assumed that the support is limited to less novel
RES-E technologies, whilst in the case of non-tech-
nology-specific support the variant refers to the neg-
ligence of the investor’s risk (as commonly associat-
ed with uncertain earnings in the TGC market).
One target is assumed for future RES-E deployment
in 2020 in all cases based on harmonised support in
order to be able to compare the economic efficiency
of the different policy options – i.e.it is assumed that
about 1156 TWh have to be generated by RES-E at
the EU-25 level by 2020, similar to the “improved
national policies” case. Note that regarding har-
monised support options a transition period is taken
into account. Accordingly, new and improved har-
monised policies offering equal financial incentives
throughout Europe are then applied to new RES-E
installations from 2015 onwards.
A comparison of the cumulated consumer expendi-
ture for new RES-E installations – i.e.the total trans-
fer costs due to the promotion of new installations in
the observed period 2005 to 2020 as well as the resid-
ual costs after 2020 – is shown in Figure 8 for the
investigated cases. This figure illustrates both the
cost-efficiency and the effectiveness of RES-E sup-
port options, expressing the cumulated consumer
expenditures in specific terms, i.e. per MWh induced
RES-E generation. The following conclusions are
drawn from this diagram:
– The cumulated transfer costs for consumers are
lowest when applying technology-specific support
harmonised throughout Europe achieved by
applying feed-in tariffs.There are marginal differ-
ences between the two variants,i.e.by considering
or neglecting novel RES-E options.
– Improved national policies with a similar deploy-
ment of new RES-E result in slightly higher spe-
cific costs corresponding to an increase of +18
percent compared to the technology-specific sup-
port provided within a harmonised scheme
(including novel RES-E options).
– Higher specific costs can be expected from con-
tinuing current RES-E support. With BAU, the
specific costs are 49 percent higher compared to
harmonised technology-specific support. It is
worth mentioning that the overall deployment of
new RES-E is 29 percent lower with BAU than
with all other policy options.
– The most inefficient policy option in terms of
costs is harmonised, but non technology-specific
support as provided by a uniform EU-wide TGC
system, which results in much higher consumer
expenditures ranging from + 60 to + 68 per-
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COMPARISON OF NECESSARY CUMULATED CONSUMER EXPENDITURE 
FOR NEW RES-E
Note: This depiction shows the necessary cumulated consumer expenditure (i.e. the cumulated present value 
(2005) of yearly transfer cost) due to the support of new RES-E (installed 2005 to 2020), expressed per MWh
EUR/MWhRES
induced RES-E generation for the investigated cases.
Figure 8terpart  incl. novel RES-E options – depending
whether the investor’s risk is neglected or taken
into account.
Conclusions
The empirical findings presented in this paper show
that instruments which have proven to be effective
also tend to be economically efficient. Feed-in sys-
tems, which are implemented in the majority of EU
member states, have initiated significant growth of
renewable energy generation at moderate costs for
society. The main reason for this observation is the
long-term price security of the system combined
with technology diversification of support. Com-
pared to short-term trading in renewable certificate
markets, the intrinsic stability of feed-in systems
appears to be a key element for success.
The key criterion for achieving an enhanced future
deployment of RES-E in an effective and efficient
manner, besides the continuity and long-term stabil-
ity of any implemented policy, is the technology
specification of the necessary support. Concentrat-
ing on only the currently most cost-competitive tech-
nologies would exclude the more innovative tech-
nologies needed in the long run. Furthermore, it
would not be possible to achieve any moderate to
ambitious RES-E target without considering these
novel RES-E options. In other words technology
neutrality may be cost-efficient in the short term but
is more expensive in the long term.
Even in the short term, the producer profits involved
in the promotion of RES-E as well as observable cost
differences among cheap to moderate RES-E options
suggest a diversification of support. Most of the
European success stories of promoting RES-E over
the past decades in an effective and economically effi-
cient way were driven by feed-in tariffs, which are
implemented in a technology-specific manner.
The results of the modelling exercise clearly indicate
that the major part of possible efficiency gains can
already be exploited by optimising RES-E support
measures at the national level – about two thirds of
the overall cost reduction potential can be attributed
to optimising national support schemes.Further effi-
ciency improvements at a considerably lower level
(about one third of the overall cost reduction poten-
tial) are possible through an EU wide harmonisation
of the support schemes provided that technology-
specific support is implemented. In contrast, if har-
monisation meant putting all the RES-E options in
one basket and giving equal support to all the RES-
E technologies considered, then the accompanying
consumer expenditures would increase significantly
if the RES-E target is ambitious. Consequently, a
harmonised non technology-specific support would
decrease efficiency of support.
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